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Abstract 
Unless program managers (PM) tackle cost containment head-on, future weapon 
system acquisition successes may be jeopardized, resulting in fewer products and services 
to equip the nation’s warfighters. The United States can ill afford any decrease in its 
preparedness when the nation is currently waging war on two fronts. This research 
examines cost containment in the context of Total Life Cycle Cost Management. A more 
thorough understanding and aggressive application of cost-containment strategies could 
conceivably shift acquisition outcomes to a more cost-effective posture. Responding to a 
survey conducted as part of this research, 887 Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition 
professionals provided input on cost containment, including tool types and associated 
processes. Of those 887 respondents, 223 were current or former DoD PMs with over 11 
years of experience—the primary basis of this research analysis. 
Keywords: Life Cycle Cost Management (LCCM), Cost Containment, Cost as an 
Independent Variable (CAIV), Performance Based Logistics (PBL), Cost Analysis 







Is there a superior acquisition development decision aid that can assure more 
program successes and help contain costs? Interestingly enough, some of the most basic 
tools currently at our disposal in the Department of Defense (DoD) are already ideally suited 
to help achieve acquisition excellence. They can also have a significant impact on fiscal 
outcomes. For some time, program managers (PMs) have had access to these in the form 
of a customized Tool Kit that outlines and characterizes a wide array of helpful decision aids 
and measures (DAU, 2009b), including: 
  
Figure 1. Technology Readiness Level 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL). 
Tempers technology insertion by measuring technology 
maturity; ensures technology properly finds its way into 
development efforts, while accounting for any associated risks; 
and considers performance and life-cycle factors before a 
technology solution is finalized. 
 
 
Figure 2. Earned Value Management 
Earned Value Management (EVM). 
Predicts cost and schedule perturbations, provides early 
warning, and serves as a forecasting tool that ties itself to 
traceable physical work packages (under an overall Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS)). 
 Figure 3. Cost Analysis Requirements 
Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD). 
Provides comprehensive and detailed descriptions of 
acquisition programs; supports Program Office Estimates 
(POE), Component Cost Analyses (CCA), and independent 
Life Cycle Cost Estimates (LCCE).  
 
 
Figure 4. Technical and Management Processes 
Technical and Management Processes.   Ensure 
products properly evolve from concept to deployment; set the 
stage for the selection of a wide range of alternative design 
approaches through an integrated superset of design, 







Figure 5. Performance-based Logistics 
Performance-based Logistics (PBL). “Provides a means for 
the resource-constrained program management office to 
develop, implement, and manage the sustainment of a system 
over its life cycle” (Fowler, 2009). 
 
Figure 6. Cost as an Independent Variable 
Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV). Weighs 
affordable performance capabilities and scheduling based on 
cost goals that can be realized by a set of decisions that 
balances programmatic risks (Rush, 1997). Also serves as a 
trade-off tool to achieve Reduced Total Ownership Costs 
(Pallas & Novak, 2000). 
 
Taken together, these tools can give PMs the power to overcome many of the 
looming programmatic hurdles that continue to surface as often as the weather changes. 
Many other helpful decision aids are available and designed specifically to combat the 
challenges PMs face every day. Considering this wide and diverse array of decision aids, 
what is missing? What have we actually failed to characterize that ostensibly fuels cost 
growth? Why do examples keep surfacing like the MV-22 Osprey, in which costs per flight 
hour—currently at $11,000—are expected to more than double the target estimate (Clark, 
2009)? If so many variable costs can fluctuate, can they be properly tracked and addressed 
in time to contain costs? 
One methodology in particular was expected to give truthful predictions of total costs. 
But, its value has presumably diminished in the face of the very dynamic and complex 
processes normally associated with acquisition programs in the DoD. It goes by the name 
Life Cycle Cost Management (LCCM). Up to now, it has been used to understand both the 
wide array of system costs that start with a program’s initial baseline and run all the way 
through disposal. 
Discussion 
Conceptually, LCCM is not new. As early as 1936, T. P. Wright had already created 
cost-estimating equations to predict the cost of airplanes over long production runs 
(Hamaker, 1994). Oddly enough, many are still in use today. In varying degrees, support for 
LCCM continued to grow ever since. In 1975, an Air Force working group recommended five 















NASA ? ? ? ?
CASA Cost Analyses Strategy 
Assessment
LOGSA ? ? ? ?
EDCAS Equipment Designer’s 
Cost Analysis System
TFD Group ? ? ? ?
MAAP Monterey Activity‐base 
Analytical Platform
TFD Group ? ? ? ?
FLEX Navy Material 
Command LCC Model
NAVAIR  ? ? ? ?
LCCA Life Cycle Cost Analyzer Northrop 
Grumman ? ? ? ?
LCCH Life Cycle Cost Model Air Force(TASC) ? ? ? ?
Price Family of Models for 
Costing/Evaluation
Lockheed Martin ? ? ? ?
ZCORE Cost Oriented Resource 
Estimating Model




(USAF, USA) ? ? ? ?
 Program offices be provided with a source of personnel familiar with analytical 
techniques; 
 Engineers and analysts be given general guidance on how to develop, adapt, 
and use life-cycle cost models for specific applications; 
 Program office and supporting personnel have access to a short course in the 
subject of development and application of LCC models and methods; 
 Periodic life-cycle cost methods workshops be held; and 
 Program office personnel be provided with a central focus of expertise in which 
lessons learned in each new life-cycle application are integrated with existing 
LCC models and methods (McKenzie, 1978). 
LCCM is certainly not an underdeveloped concept, either. Over the years, a number 
of LCC models have surfaced to help programs fashion their overall funding profiles. Each 
model takes into account the broad range of a system’s true costs, including its economic 
life, inflation rates, discount rates, total number of cost elements that comprise the system, 
magnitude of cost elements, salvage value, etc. But to this day, when asked about their 
experience with LCC models, their applicability, usefulness, ease of use, and limitations are 
viewed as questionable by many, including the DoD’s most experienced program managers 
(see Table 1).  
Table 1. Program Managers Quantify LCC Models 
Sentiments like those expressed by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA, 2008) are common among many acquisition professionals with 
comparable years of experience on the subject of developing/relying upon the accuracy of 
LCC estimates that models like these provide: 
It involves using incomplete, inaccurate, and changing data for an outmoded & 





quantity of an undefined new space system to satisfy an overly exaggerated and 
unvalidated requirement at some time in the future, under uncertain conditions, with 
a minimum of funds. (p. 17) 
Whatever model or methodology is selected, carefully (and frequently) applying it 
can have a lasting effect on cost containment. Of primary importance is the selection of the 
most suitable LCC model(s). Each characterizes a number of important variables a little 
differently. Nonetheless, each LCC model also has the capacity to magnify cost drivers, 
early and often. Regrettably, Booz Allen-Hamilton reported that the “real issue is one of 
obtaining the data in a timely manner and of reducing the redundant data collection effort 
needed every time a cost-effectiveness question arises in the decision-making arena” 
(Leggitt, 1981, p. 13). However, unless PMs alter their views on their usefulness and 
frequency of use, these models/methodologies will likely have less influence on key 
decisions.  
Fundamentally, LCCM is actually an extraordinary concept, which is generally 
described through two manifestations. The first, LCC, accounts for research and 
development costs, investment costs, operating and support costs, and disposal costs over 
the system’s entire life cycle. The second, Total Ownership Cost (TOC), consists of LCC 
elements as well as other infrastructure or business process costs not necessarily 
attributable to the program (USD(AT&L), 2008). Understanding all the costs and all the 
implications associated with LCCM may seem intimidating. So many unknowns and so 
many combinations and permutations come into play that can easily vary, making it difficult 
to quantify any system’s total costs, especially when it matters most—during the birth of a 
program.  
In 2006, to raise more awareness, the DoD elevated the ranking of ownership costs 
to a Key System Attribute (KSA) in anticipation of drawing more attention early on (Kobren, 
2009). Have we given LCCM enough attention to have an impact though? Probably not. And 
if not, how can we garner even more attention and emphasis on this KSA? Perhaps we 
should just call it what it is—Aggregate Management. After all, it aggregates everything that 
could possibly affect the cost of materializing anything that actually gets built and eventually 
fielded in the DoD.  
Investment budgets are shrinking, and without additional attention, initial concepts 
designed to meet some requirement might take a lot longer to materialize or cost a whole lot 
more to produce and sustain—both problematic scenarios that we as a nation can ill afford. 
LCCM needs to be somehow re-energized. Increasing its use would trigger the robust part 
of the LCCM challenge—encouraging deeper thinking, acting more critically, and pursuing 
more creative methods to contain overall costs. “Years earlier, Lt Gen James T. Stewart, 
USAF (Ret.), indicated  one of the threats to cost containment and described it as ‘yo-yo 
funding’ (Dapore & Bryant, 1984) that persists even today in the DoD’s Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process.” 
Exchange with Subject Matter Experts 
The authors conducted two focus sessions with a handful of acquisition experts who 
teach the art and science of LCCM and cost estimating. Their experiences, combined with 
frequent contact with acquisition colleagues inside and outside the classroom, highlighted 





Their first meeting was with the Logistics Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). Each SME 
confirmed that LCCM issues persist. They noted LCCM considerations continue to be 
minimized up front, where they could have the most significant impact. They also stressed 
any discussion on LCCM tends to be short-lived, especially further down the acquisition 
continuum and after initial modeling (R. Burroughs, personal communication, September 17, 
2009). 
To amplify the importance of LCCM, the SMEs recommended instituting an LCC 
breach construct (similar to the intent behind Nunn-McCurdy breaches). For example, if a 
program exceeded its LCC baseline by a fixed cost percentage similar to the construct 
established by Nunn-McCurdy, PMs would have to report any infringement to Congress. 
They also indicated that it would be beneficial to establish a formulary similar to TRLs where 
a program could not proceed to the next phase until it demonstrated some minimum level of 
achievement (M. Sherman, personal communication, September 17, 2009). 
Currently, the DoD expects LCC reassessments after an initial one is developed, but 
do these subsequent updates give enough attention to cost containment? Not explicitly.  
The logistics SMEs emphasized both the lack in LCCM discipline and the absence of 
cross communication in programs that generally need it the most throughout a program’s life 
cycle. They accentuated that funding allocations and key decisions typically seem to be 
focused on development and not sustainment. And, without a tool to respond to the dynamic 
nature of LCC that accounts for all costs, including Operations and Support (O&S), there will 
be little forewarning that a sustainment breach might be close at hand (M. Sherman, 
personal communication, September 22, 2009). 
O&S costs constitute the majority of a program’s total costs—a widely recognized 
tenet in DoD program management. As recently as March 2007, the Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group (CAIG) reaffirmed that “projected O&S costs average 60-65 percent of 
projected life-cycle costs after reviewing 34 Major Defense Acquisition Programs, or 
MDAPs” (CAIG, 2007). Just as strikingly, at the end of a program’s research and 
development effort and just prior to production or operations, 95% of the cumulative LCC 
has already been committed (DoE, 1997). So, is the lack of attention actually warranted in 
subsequent life-cycle phases given the questionable ability to influence O&S costs? The 
authors suspected so, but were anxious to hear and consider divergent views from the 
Budget, Cost, and Financial Management experts.  
The authors next met with four Budget, Cost Estimating, and Financial Management 
(BCEFM) SMEs. This group echoed the same sentiment voiced by the Logistics SMEs: 
Sustainment tends to get minimized early in the development phase. However, they added 
that the “ilities” are generally not well defined. They stated LCCM typically suffers from a 
lack of sufficient cost detail to adequately address sustainment costs that predominate once 
systems find their way into operations (J. Rego, personal communication, September 22, 
2009). 
The BCEFM SMEs quickly reached a consensus on one of the major obstacles to 
cost containment. They stated that funding instability makes cost containment an 
insurmountable prospect. Already faced with many other daily programmatic challenges, 
they asserted that funding instability, typically manifested by perpetual budget cuts, creates 
a gyrating funding baseline on top of other strategic concerns including: 
 Industry partners who are not necessarily motivated by cost containment, 





 Internal staffing shortfalls that are sometimes tough to fill, 
 Lack of certain key functional experience in program offices, and  
 Cultural realities that emphasize program survival over program affordability.  
The BCEFM SMEs also affirmed that if PMs found a cost metric that had a strong 
influence in controlling costs well after the “truthful predictions,” then it would be widely used 
and could perhaps help contain costs (J. Rego, personal communication, September 22, 
2009). EVM satisfies the forecasting piece of the equation, but without specific and practical 
motivational methods that help contain costs, its usefulness is questionable. So, do those 
specific methods exist today? The answer is yes. Contract incentive strategies are one of 
many tools available, and have been used extensively in the DoD to help curb some of the 
escalating technical risks and associated costs. However, they have tended to provide more 
short-term gains than the ones needed for longer-term, and more enduring, outcomes in the 
past few years, especially when technology maturity is so fluid (GAO, 2005).  
LCC in Practice Today 
Today, in the context of containing costs in acquisition programs in the DoD, PMs 
are compelled to address LCCM across their program’s life cycle. As mentioned earlier, 
though, well before a PM’s arrival, much of the projected life-cycle costs for future systems 
or products is rooted in decisions made during the early phases of advanced planning and 
conceptual design (Blanchard, 1992). Consequently, initial LCC assessments have always 
been a key component of a program’s “go/no go” decision process since they address a 
program’s affordability and are ultimately dependent on the military department’s (or 
agency’s) ability to secure the necessary funding. Each military department and agency 
gives LCCM a lot of attention at the beginning of a system’s life cycle. However, in addition 
to LCCM concerns, military departments and agencies must balance today’s operational 
needs with future requirements, while simultaneously ensuring that they do not neglect more 
capable systems still in various stages of development. These considerations are critical—
all designed to either boost current system performance or meet new warfighter/user 
requirements. 
LCC projections are not expected to be dormant once PMs take charge. Title 10 of 
the United States Code § 2434 requires the Secretary of Defense to consider an 
independent Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) before approving Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD), or Production and Deployment (P&D) of an MDAP. In 
practice, LCC gets looked at closely via an assortment of predictive analyses (probabilistic 
and deterministic) that sometimes can be difficult to absorb. So much so, that it is generally 
left to the experts to decipher. Very few PMs ever find themselves digging into LCC 
parameters. Besides, they have the experts in their respective program offices who analyze 
and weigh the output. Even so, many variables make it sometimes difficult for even the 
experts to fully quantify. The experts, who generally populate the models with key 
assumptions, do their best to leverage the behavior of analogous systems. Still, quantifying 
all the assumptions is a daunting task when so many parameters are so variable or have not 
been captured or qualified. Ultimately, the responsibility resides with the PM to embrace 
LCC estimates, but do they and their staffs revalidate these estimates on a more routine 
basis? Do they dive deeper into the basis of the original LCC estimate and make any 





PMs recognize that LCC generally starts out with an “inferred” cost-containment 
element before their programs leave the initial approval process gate. What happens later is 
a combination of art and science mixed with some uneasiness. PMs are expected to 
quantify the anticipated costs of their development system across the Future Years Defense 
Program (FYDP). For ACAT IC and ID programs, LCC is carefully revisited by Congress in 
the context of Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) when costs escalate by least 15% or 
more of the current baseline, or 30% or more over the original baseline (DAU, 2009b, p. 31). 
However, in addition to LCCM concerns, military departments and agencies must balance 
today’s operational needs with future requirements, and not neglect more capable systems 
still in various stages of development—designed to either boost current system performance 
or meet new warfighter/user requirements. 
After Milestone B (formal initiation of an acquisition program), PMs tend to narrow 
their focus on managing their programs day-to-day. This day-to-day strategy is about 
program survival. PMs dwell on cost, schedule, and performance parameters in the face of 
too little funding, too little schedule flexibility, and too many technology hurdles. If LCC 
models are seen as an initial forecasting apparatus only to give a reasonable grounding of 
all known costs—but not necessarily designed to contain costs—how could cost, schedule, 
and performance become more tightly integrated into the overall LCCM equation? And, what 
about CAIV? Where does it fit in? As originally envisioned, CAIV was designed to give PMs 
the flexibility to balance all the factors that could help contain costs—but has it? What do 
PMs have to say about CAIV? How are LCC and CAIV related? Are they related? What do 
PMs think about these questions? Their perspectives follow. 
Survey Findings 
The objective data generated by this opinion survey confirmed what some earlier 
studies found in LCCM. In addition, the data offered quite a few other interesting 
perspectives as well, especially in the way PMs view LCCM and CAIV regarding cost-
containment principles. The survey also reinforced how PMs unevenly apply LCCM 
principles and cost-containment strategies across their programs.  
Even though the opinions expressed in this survey were based on fundamental 
beliefs, opinions invariably drive decisions since they are inextricably linked to 
“experiences”—an imperative in the DoD’s acquisition enterprise, and one of the key factors 
designed to help meet the certification requirements of the acquisition corps. In other words, 
opinions matter in the acquisition profession when such opinions are steeped in years of 
acquisition experience. Burrowing into the invaluable experiences that have shaped the 
DoD’s current PM workforce can also be a very meaningful bellwether. In this particular 
survey, PMs provided specific narrative comments that acknowledged certain cost-
containment hurdles. The survey also found a couple of misconceptions regarding the use 
and usefulness of some of these cost-containment tools in the Tool Kit. The discussion that 





LCC Model Familiarity and Experience 
When PMs were asked to rate the LCC models that they had previously used, many 
were simply unfamiliar with the models. Provided below are representative comments from 
the opinion survey results (See Table 2). ACAT I Program Managers with over 11 Years of 
Experience, Review LCCM Models 
Sorry, just not that familiar with the models. 
Somebody else uses them and provides data 
to me. 
~ 
As a PM, I have not been involved with 
the detailed execution of the specific model 
used to derive cost estimates. In many 
instances, costs and cost estimates were 
derived from legacy numbers of the previous 
program. 
~ 
To be honest, not my field of expertise, 
and I am only familiar with the tools to the 
extent my team uses them. 
~ 
I have no first-hand knowledge of any of these 
systems/models. 
Usefulness of LCC Models 
PMs believed that the P&D and O&S phases are better predictors of costs, while the 
Technology Development (TD) and EMD phases are generally the most influential in driving 
decisions. Contrary to what the DoD would prefer, they did not believe the pre-acquisition 
phases (Materiel Solution Analysis and TD) are suitable for cost containment given their 
inability to qualify, let alone quantify, some of the major “unknowns.” More importantly, by 
the time their programs entered EMD, a large number of PMs declared that LCC models 
have significantly underestimated costs. PMs also stated these models need more precision 
in the early stages of program initiation since they drive so many future decisions (Table 2). 
Organizations like the CAIG recommended that PMs should seek more research that 
focused on “scrubbing development and procurement, more detailed analysis of 
sustainment profiles, and identification of causal factors” (CAIG, 2007). 
Representative Narrative Comments. A sampling of comments on the way PMs 
view LCCM and its cost-containment principles follows. 
Most models have many assumptions, and those assumptions are not 
monitored over time; and risks are not addressed to keep the 
assumptions valid, so the models are not valuable when decision makers 
really need the information. 
 
LCC for O&S appears to be generally unrealistic. 
 
As programs proceed along their life cycle, LCC doesn’t seem to be 
appropriately updated. 
Table 2. ACAT I Program Managers with over 





LCCM never captures changes allowed/forced on programs, and fails to 
"predict" well. Models are used early on, but eventually lose influence as 
"inertia" takes over and programs enter "make the best of it mode." 
 
Overly optimistic estimates. 
 
No one seems to put the thought and time into a thorough estimate of 
determining LCC. 
 
No one seems to update LCC and use it as a yardstick. 
Major Obstacles to Cost 
Containment   
Of the many typical challenges that 
PMs face, five obstacles accounted for 
a noticeable majority of the reasons 
that made cost containment difficult to 
overcome, according to PMs with at 
least 11 years of experience. As seen 
in the Figure 7, those five standing in 
the way included requirements creep, 
underfunded programs, annual budget 
fluctuations, ambitious program 
schedules, and too many policy and 
bureaucratic obstacles.  
Revisit Rates for LCC Estimates 
Despite whether revisiting LCC estimates was viewed as a burden or resource constraint, 
about half of the PMs routinely or frequently 
reviewed their program’s LCCs unless in 
preparation for an upcoming milestone review 
(Figure 8). While a great forcing function, 
performing LCC updates only in preparation for 
the next milestone is probably too late to 
significantly influence cost containment. 
However, PEOs and/or senior managers 
showed even less interest in LCC estimates, 
other than for preparation for the next milestone 
(Figure 8). Without more frequent and intensive 
reviews by either PMs or PEOs, the ability to 
make cost adjustments becomes more difficult 
to defend.  
Representative Narrative Comments. A 
sampling of comments on revisiting LCC 
highlights this seemingly low level of interest in 




Figure 1. Program Managers Rate the Challenges They Face






The costs that are of the most concern to me are those in the immediate execution 
year. I have considered out-year costs but not as much as I should have. 
~ 
My focus is on providing most capability within budget, not on future life-cycle costs. 
~ 
General knowledge on cost containment among all program office personnel is very 
low. 
~ 
Many of the cost growths are based on not really understanding the requirements 
and instead based on assumptions on both sides. 
Significant Cost Drivers 
Identifying and knowing the significance of key cost drivers are paramount. 
Otherwise, the ability to contain costs could easily weaken. As seen in Figure 9, when asked 
how they would rate the 
significance of many of 
the classic cost drivers, 





instability, and artificially 
low cost estimates, were 
the most significant. With 
the addition of artificially 
low cost estimates and 
too many policy and 
bureaucratic obstacles, 
these were the same 
obstacles that made cost 
containment difficult to 
overcome when an even 
wider selection of survey 
choices was posed to PMs in an earlier question (see Figure 7).  
Connection Between CAIV and LCC 
CAIV is another key tool available to help 
contain costs as previously discussed. It gives PMs a 
flexible instrument to help quantify the undeniable 
relationship(s) between certain performance requirements 
and realistic cost constraints. However, only 65% of the 
PMs acknowledged either a “strong” or “moderate” 
connection to LCC (see Figure 10). Subsequently, PMs 
might see CAIV as a quick fix only, and not fully appreciate 
the extent of the long-term gain; not believe there is a long-
term gain; or perhaps not fully believe in the concept as a 
whole. 
Figure 4. Program Managers Rate Their Cost Drivers 






Representative Narrative Comments. A sampling of comments on the relationship 
between CAIV and LCC shows a program management community less comfortable with 
CAIV as a cost control tool. 
Strong in theory but weak in practice. 
~ 
I think the relationship between LCC and CAIV has been diminished. 
~ 
I’ve never seen CAIV used to contain costs on a program. 
~ 
I don’t believe CAIV has anything to do with CAIV. It’s an artificial constraint that prevents 
the PM from meeting the requirements. 
~ 
I didn’t see CAIV used in any organized way because hardly anyone on the PM team has 
enough practical experience. 
~ 
Unfortunately, the CAIV tool of last resort became common to overcome cost overruns due 
to funding stability and poor execution. 
~ 
CAIV trades are rarely supported by the requirements community. The requirements 
community is 99 percent focused on capability and mildly interested in long-term O&S cost-
reduction efforts. 
Training Challenges 
PMs stated a need for additional training, primarily LCCM and Risk Management 
training, to help them better contain costs. Perhaps this increased training could help 
strengthen cost-containment strategies.  






To reconcile some of the shortcomings of LCC and, just as importantly, better 
prepare PMs to contain costs and achieve more successful acquisition outcomes, the 
authors of this research recommend the following: 
 Take the chill out of cost containment and re-energize LCCM. Make it everyone’s 
business. Even though PMs cannot serve as LCC experts, they and their 
teammates should know the basis of their own LCC estimates throughout their 
program’s life cycle, and not wait until the next milestone to make any necessary 
adjustment(s). 
 Elevate LCC to a Key Performance Parameter—it will compel more PMs and 
senior personnel to rigorously exercise LCCM principles. Establishing LCC as a 
KSA is not enough. 
 Continuously challenge strategies that are tightly coupled with their underlying 
assumptions. 
 Base cost decisions on programmatic realities and more current data since these 
influence LCC outcomes. 
 Establish an LCC Continuous Learning Model (CLM) that amplifies the objectives 
and characteristics of an LCC model and identifies the family of LCC models that 
best apply where, how, and when. 
 Add an LCC best practice link to each functional Community of Practice (CoP) 
where PMs can learn from others. 
 Establish LCCM trip wires throughout a program’s life cycle, and do not penalize 
PMs for reporting unfavorable but essentially accurate program information to 
seniors or higher headquarters. 
 Reward and incentivize PMs for containing and/or lowering costs. 
 Develop cost-containment strategies that are carefully evaluated and painless to 
execute.  
 Embrace innovation and dismiss mundane strategies that guarantee less-than-
optimal outcomes. 
 Promote more CAIV. Conceptually, CAIV was placed into the acquisition arsenal 
to give PMs a little more latitude with performance versus cost trade-offs. As 
ADM Mike Mullen, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently said at 
the Program Executive Officer/Systems Command Commanders’ Conference at 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on November 4, 2009, “The acquisition community and the 
warfighter will have to jointly accept the 80 percent solution…we have to be 
realistic with what we can afford” (Mullen, 2009). 
 Let PMs lead. PMs have the knowledge, skill, and ability to carefully guide their 






This research reinforced the many contrasting perspectives that PMs possess with 
respect to cost containment and their ability to influence and/or control it. As originally 
conceived, understanding the usefulness and criticality of LCCM can have a major impact 
on weapons systems developments by keeping a lid on rising costs—a growing necessity. 
The acquisition environment will invariably change. Budgets will shrink; fewer new systems 
will be built and fielded; more pressure will be exerted on extending and sustaining current 
systems; and more pressure can be expected on containing costs—much more pressure. 
The remaining weapons systems under development will come under political fire. As 
external scrutiny swells, programmatic decisions will be challenged since there will be so 
much more information immediately available about emerging systems. So, how can PMs 
once and for all silence the skeptics and achieve positive acquisition outcomes? For 
starters, they can shock the critics by challenging the programmatic “cost status quo” at 
every juncture and not just the major milestones. They can no longer “kid themselves” about 
what something is going to cost, as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics Ashton Carter recently stated (Carter, 2009). They can increase programmatic 
“cost accuracy” by better understanding and re-energizing one key cost-containment 
practice that has seen less action or become ineffective in recent years—LCCM. Inarguably, 
yo-yo funding will continue. Poor outcomes need not. The DoD cannot afford more of the 
same. Changes to DoD 5000.02 that now call for Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR) prior to 
Milestone B and earlier measured prototyping to lower out-year costs will go a long way. 
Warfighters need every penny applied to capability, not cost overruns. Ultimately, PMs and 
their staffs must be more introspective and tightly integrate the art and the science of 
containing costs in the face of global economic changes. It’s time to take the chill out of 
containing costs. The DoD depends on it; our nation depends on it; and the warfighters need 
to count on it. 
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Appendix: List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
ACAT Acquisition Category 
ACWP Actual Cost of Work Performed 
ADM Admiral 
BAC Budget at Completion 
BCEFM Business, Cost Estimating, and Financial Management 
BCWP Budget Cost for Work Performed 
BCWS Budget Cost for Work Scheduled 
CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
CAIV Cost as an Independent Variable 
CARD Cost Analysis Requirements Description 
CDR Critical Design Review 
EAC Estimate at Completion 
DAU Defense Acquisition University 
CDD Capability Development Document 
CPD Capability Production Document 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoE Department of Energy 
EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
EVM Earned Value Management 
FOC Full Operational Capability 
FRP Full Rate Production 
FYDP Future Years Defense Program 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
ICD Initial Capabilities Document 
IOC Initial Operational Capability 
KPP Key Performance Parameter 
KSA Key System Attribute 
LCC Life Cycle Cost 
LCCE Life Cycle Cost Estimate 
LCCM Life Cycle Cost Management 





NASA National Aeronautics & Space Administration 
O&S Operations and Support 
PAUC Program Acquisition Unit Cost 
PBL Performance Based Logistics 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
PM Program Manager 
POE Program Office Estimate 
MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Program 
P&D Production and Deployment 
PEO Program Executive Office 
PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
Ret. Retired 
SME Subject-matter Expert 
SYSCOM Systems Command 
TAB Total Allocated Budget 
TD Technology Development 
TOC Total Ownership Cost 
TRL Technology Readiness Level 
USAF United States Air Force 
USN United States Navy 
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